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ABSTRACT
Tensions between the United States and the Russian Federation have broken 
out into a new Cold War following Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Following the 
seizure of Crimea and the fomenting of civil war in the Donbass, Russia was 
punished by an international contingent of states following the American lead 
in sanctioning Russia and isolating it from the world stage. With the sanctions 
having caused a great deal of damage to the Russian economy, the Russian 
government struck back by attacking the 2016 US Presidential election. Gam-
bling on candidate Donald Trump, Russia hoped to strike the US at its heart 
and end this conflict before it becomes a prolonged Cold War.
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INTRODUCTION
It is common knowledge that the United States and the Soviet Union 
battled for decades in a frozen ideological conflict. What is unique is 
that the United States could overcome superior Soviet numbers with 
advanced technology by better means of communication and informa-
tion collection. Nearly 30 years after the Cold War, the focus of technol-
ogy within the state has allowed rival nations to catch up to the United 
States, to the point of near parity. One example of this would be the 
Russian Federation (the successor state to the Soviet Union), which has 
styled itself a major cyber capable nation. Former Director of National 
Intelligence James Clapper stated in 2015 that Russia was one of the top 
cyber threats that the United States faced today1.  Director Clapper’s 
declaration regarding Russia as a cyber threat reflects their increased 
abilities and increased disdain towards the United States.
In 2014, the Russian Federation annexed the territory of Crimea from 
neighboring Ukraine, and began sponsoring a separatist civil war in the 
southeastern part of Ukraine, known as the Donbass. This seemingly 
aggressive stance to violate the territorial sovereignty of a neighboring 
nation led to international condemnation led by the United States and 
its allies in Europe. In response to Russia’s hostilities, the United States 
and the European Union passed economic sanctions barring trade with 
Russian banking, defense, and energy companies. Years later, these 
sanctions are still having an impact. Russian President Vladimir Putin ac-
knowledged that the sanctions are hurting the Russian economy, but has 
stated that these sanctions are harming the global economy as well since 
Russia is an integral part of that economy2. 
The United States and the European Union reviewed these sanctions 
after multiple legislative sessions since their original inception. Russia, in 
turn, has responded rather aggressively through militaristic and clan-
destine means. To sidestep sanctions and retaliate, Russia conducted an 
operation that not even the Soviet Union was capable of: Coordinating 
an attack on the American political system by hijacking the 2016 Pres-
idential election through cyber means. Such strong actions from both 
nations have strained relations to a point not seen since the Cold War. 
Coincidentally, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev stated at the 
2016 Munich Security Conference, “Speaking bluntly, we are rapidly 
rolling into a period of a new Cold War.”3  Tensions between the United 
States and Russia have indeed rolled into a new Cold War and Russian 
cyber meddling of the American Presidential election is indicative of this 
new frozen conflict.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Tensions, Sanctions, and the Presidential Election
As previously mentioned, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev 
declared early on in 2016 the presence of a new Cold War. The 
significance of this is the fact that he is the second highest-ranking official 
in the Russian government. While Russian President Vladimir Putin has not 
openly declared the same, rhetoric from his speeches indicates a similar 
sentiment towards the current geopolitical climate. 
Putin has repeatedly made many aggressive accusations regarding the 
United States over an extensive period. In his address to the Munich 
Security Conference in 2007, Vladimir Putin blatantly accused the United 
States of violating international law, expanding its borders without UN 
approval, and imposing unfair economic and cultural policies upon other 
nations4.  In his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2014, Putin 
blatantly told members of the Russian government that the United States 
would have tried anything to contain increasing Russian capabilities on 
the world stage, regardless of the situations in Ukraine.5 In his 2017 annual 
call in and answer, Putin told one citizen that it has been the policy of 
international actors to try and contain Russia once they have seen it as 
an international rival, and that this policy by the US Senate (on drafting 
further sanctions) only highlighted this desire to contain Russia amidst 
a period of domestic struggle.6 Beyond the idea of “containing Russia”, 
Putin has also recently again accused the United States of violating 
international law (in response to the US missile strike on the Syrian Air 
Base) in an attempt to further strain United States-Russian relations and 
deter efforts of combatting global terrorism.7
While Putin and the Russian government interpret the current situation as 
one of freezing tensions, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has voiced 
the American position on the situation since the previous administration: 
This situation can only be reversed if Russia changes course on Crimea 
and stops interfering in Ukraine.8  The previous administration never 
openly declared a new Cold War as Russia has, but the rhetoric of 
President Barack Obama shows a position of freezing tensions. 
In December of 2016, President Obama announced that he had signed 
Executive orders targeting Russian intelligence services in retaliation 
for harassment of American diplomats in Russia and, specifically, the 
meddling of the 2016 US Presidential election.9 The FBI and DHS released 
a joint statement that said that they were confident that the Russian 
government used cyber means to meddle in the US Presidential election.10  
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In the detailed Joint Action Report (JAR), the two US government entities 
attributed the attacks to APT28 and APT29.11 The JAR details how APT29 
began targeting the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in 2015 while 
APT28 began its attack in spring of 2016. The JAR states that APT29 
began its assault by launching a spear phishing campaign that targeted 
over 1,000 US government personnel. The campaign installed malware 
on internal networks once personnel opened malicious links under the 
guise of opening honest and authentic links. The malware included many 
different Remote Access Tools (RATs) that allowed APT29 unauthorized 
systems access to these networks. APT28 launched a similar attack in 
2016, but the objective was to steal user credentials by having personnel 
change passwords. This allowed APT28 access to the same networks to 
work its attack.
These cyber-attacks on the US Presidential election show a brazen 
effort to scope out a target. In cyber security, this is called “profiling” or 
conducting “reconnaissance.”12 This was important for two reasons: It gave 
the Russian government access to data of American government officials, 
and that data was then used during a wider information war.13 The 
tensions that resulted from the seizure of Crimea ultimately drew heavy 
economic sanctions from the United States, but it also created a situation 
where the Russian government spread Anti-Americanism in its strategic 
information war with the West.
The Information War 
Russia’s cyber experiment started with a Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attack against Estonia in 2007. The flood of traffic in Estonian 
cyber infrastructure was the result of punishment for Estonia altering 
with their Soviet past by moving a Soviet era statue from one location to 
another.14 This successful episode of Russia’s cyber experiment effectively 
shut down day-to-day online operations in Estonia’s cyber infrastructure 
for weeks, from news outlets to government institutions, and increased 
Russia’s confidence to continue experimenting with cyber means as a 
weapon against adversaries. The next targets would become Georgia in 
2008 and Ukraine in 2015. The cyber-attack on Georgia was conducted in 
tandem with the Five Days War of 2008, whereby Georgia was fighting 
separatists in a contested region and Russia intervened on the part of 
those separatists. This attack was another example of a DDoS attack, 
but the goals were to ensure that the Georgian people had no idea what 
was going on as well as ensure that communication between Georgian 
military forces was disrupted.15 This was achieved with relative ease, as 
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Georgia’s online infrastructure was reliant on connections based in Russia 
and Turkey. By controlling the flow of incoming traffic to Georgia, Russia 
was effectively able to counter Georgian defensive cyber actions, going 
as far as rerouting their attacks, to appear as if originating in China as 
Georgia attempted to block incoming Russian traffic.16 The Russian attack 
on Ukraine went even further than the previously mentioned DDoS attacks 
of the past.
In December of both 2015 and 2016, power companies in Ukraine 
were attacked through cyber means. The 2015 attack targeted the 
Prykarpattyaoblenergo power facility in Western Ukraine while the 2016 
attack targeted the Kyivoblenergo power facility north of the national 
capital.17 The Prykarpattyaoblenergo attack was the first attack of its kind 
on a power company while the Kyivoblenergo attack was an escalation 
and confirmation of cyber capabilities. These attacks are also only the 
second ever-recorded cyber-attacks against physical critical infrastructure 
(the first being the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear facility).18 
The cyber-attacks targeted Information Control Systems (ICS) for the 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network, which allow 
for operations of advanced systems at plants and factories. 
The level of sophistication needed for such an operation indicates that 
there was coordination between a nation state and criminal organizations.19 
To date, there has not been direct attribution to Russian Intelligence 
services, but a Russian criminal organization, Sandworm, has been 
attributed to be the source of the attacks. The likelihood of this being a 
Russian operation greatly increases when one acknowledges the fact that 
Russia has been sponsoring the armed conflict in the Donbass since early 
2014. This likelihood also increases when one takes into account the US 
government attributing the US Presidential election meddling to APT28 
and APT29: Groups associated with the Russian Intelligence Services. 
When CIA Director Mike Pompeo spoke at the annual security conference 
at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, he discussed how the 
Russian meddling in the Presidential election was nothing new and will 
only increase in the future. He also stated, “Until there is a new leader in 
Russia, I suspect it will be a threat to the United States for a long time.”20  
Director Pompeo also stated that he believed that the United States could 
expect interference in the 2018 and 2020 election cycles. He also explicitly 
stated that it is the intelligence community’s job to ensure that no one, 
whether it is a nation state like China or Russia or transnational criminal 
groups like al-Qaida, can meddle with the Presidential elections. He ended 
this discussion with saying that they will, “find ways to push back against 
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it. We are intent on doing that and we have many resources devoted to 
it. I am optimistic that we will continue to reduce the capacity of anyone 
to meddle with the election.”21 Although their technology may have 
changed and increased, the Russians have found other ways to conduct 
their information war against the United States.
Just as vital to the information war has been the use of propaganda 
through online “trolls” at Russia’s online “troll factory.” In 2015, British 
newspaper The Daily Mail reported that the Russian government was 
sponsoring the fabrication of stories on online social media to draw more 
attention to Putin and increase his popularity.22 The article explained that 
the factory would be open 24 hours a day and teams would operate in 
groups of three, working 12-hour shifts and fabricating over 100 stories 
per shift, with the aim of spreading Anti-Americanism and Anti-Western 
sentiments. Later in that year, The Guardian had reported that a Russian 
court recognized the existence of the troll factory when a free-lance 
journalist, who worked for the troll factory, sued for damages and 
won.23 The economic award was one ruble, but the symbolic award was 
forcing the government to admit its involvement in the sponsoring of 
propaganda on a massive scale. 
The exposure of the troll factory does not seem to have slowed down 
the Russian propaganda machine. In fall of 2017, social media mega 
corporation Facebook announced that Russian customers purchased 
$100,000 worth of advertisement space during and following the 2016 
US Presidential election.24 Facebook announced that the money was linked 
to over 3,000 advertisements targeting the promotion of controversial 
domestic issues in the United States, such as race tensions, gun rights, 
immigration, and LGBT rights. The investment seems to have paid off 
as public division has increased. One of the ways that this was achieved 
was through meddling with political activist groups, such as Black lives 
matter, and influencing these social groups to draw negative attention 
and negative sentiments from their opponents.25 However, this move 
may have become a double-edged sword for the Russians as American 
media focus on Russia quickly increased, and not in a positive manner.
In the United States, mention of the current political climate has been in 
the news daily throughout 2017. The “Russian Probe” as to whether or 
not the Russian government hijacked the American election is a question 
that has plagued American politics since November of 2016 and January 
of 2017 when Donald J. Trump took office. Currently, the focus of the 
“Russian Probe” is on Donald Trump’s former Presidential campaign 
manager who had noticeable ties with former Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovych: Paul Manafort. 
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The investigation originated with federal investigators looking into Paul 
Manafort, who was the campaign advisor for Donald Trump until August 
of 2016.26 The investigation grew as details of strange interactions 
between the campaign and Russian officials drew the interest of US 
intelligence agencies while the FBI was renewing its request for a Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA) warrant to continue monitoring 
Manafort.27 On October 30, 2017, Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI, 
released to the public the indictment against Manafort and the plea 
agreement of the former Presidential Campaign Foreign Policy Advisor 
George Papadopoulos.28 The investigation also released information of 
a phone call between Michael Flynn, the then National Security Advisor 
to incoming US President Trump, and Russian ambassador Sergey 
Kislyak.29 Flynn and Kislyak spoke on December 29 of 2016, the same 
day that President Obama signed Executive orders targeting the Russian 
Intelligence Services involved in meddling with the election. The fallout 
from this finding led to Flynn’s resignation from office and, eventually, the 
firing of then FBI Director James Comey. 
While the “Russia Probe” maybe in American news daily, constant 
coverage of the situation between the United States and Russia in 
American media is rather new. Before the idea of the US Presidential 
election being stolen by Russia, Americans were not nearly as concerned 
with Russia’s moves on the international stage. Indeed, only two 
administrations ago, then US President George W. Bush seemed to have 
an amiable relationship with President Putin. In early 2014, following the 
beginning of the events in Ukraine, former US President George W. Bush 
remarked on his relationship with President Putin by stating, “Vladimir is a 
person who in many ways views the U.S as an enemy. He views the world 
as either the U.S benefits and Russia loses, or vice versa.”30 This idea of “us 
versus them” can be traced as far back as the 19th century, when Russian 
international legal expert Nikolai Danilevsky began the view that Russia 
and the West were destined for a violent clash.31 This mindset of Russia 
versus the West has led to conflict with the British Empire and the United 
States throughout the 19th, 20th, and now 21st centuries.
Military Buildup
While tensions between the United States and Russia have deteriorated and 
Russia has been waging an information war, it has also been modernizing 
and building its military. In 2009, then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 
stated that Russia would be dedicated to a new arms race.32 Since 
Medvedev’s promise, it seems that Russia has indeed been building up 
its military in the form of increasing naval size, increasing army size, 
modernization of aircraft, and concentration on buildup of nuclear weapons.
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This focus on remilitarization has strained relations to point where former 
Soviet satellite nations are split ethnically between Pro-American and 
Pro-Russian sentiments. NATO troops have also become a daily site as 
these nations prepare for an aggressive Russian invasion styled on the 
intervention in Ukraine. The presence of thousands of allied troops from 
Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
being stationed in the region is a direct response to Russia conducting 
snap exercises with numbers estimated between 30,000 and 80,000 
and the announcement of the creation of 3 new divisions in the western 
half of the country.33 Further south, the alliance has created a new NATO 
base in Romania.34 The base, consisting of of 900 US troops, 4,000 
Romanian troops and supplemented with additional troops from other 
allied countries, will be tasked with monitoring Russia in the Black Sea 
while the force up north will monitor Russia’s presence along the Baltic Sea 
and Baltic States. The increase in troops from the United States to Europe 
marks the largest force that the United States has sent to Europe since 
the height of the Cold War.35 This large force, and large expanse of NATO 
territory since the end of the Cold War, has only moved to deteriorate 
tensions and further increase the state of the New Cold War.36 One of these 
threats comes in the form of missiles and adhering to international treaties.
In the 2017 State Department report on the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), the United States found Russia to 
be in continued violation of the 1987 INF Treaty.37 The INF Treaty is 
an international agreement between the United States and Russia to 
eliminate nuclear capable ground-launches missiles with a range of 500 
to 5,500 kilometers. In response to the perceived Russian violations of the 
INF Treaty, Congress voted to deny funding for the Open Skies Treaty. 
It also signed a provision in the new National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) that the United States would no longer be bound by domestic 
law to following the INF Treaty if Russia does not return to a state of 
following the treaty within 15 months of the signing of the provision.38 The 
same provision would also halt funding of the START Treaty between the 
two nations and undo the efforts at reducing the US arsenal of nuclear 
weapons that helped end the Cold War between the United States and 
the Soviet Union.
ANALYSIS
Taken solely by itself, Russian interference of the US election would not 
necessarily mean that there was a state of cold war between the two 
powers, but would definitely merit concern due to the history between 
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the two. Combined with the contextual data the United States has led 
an international delegation to economically punish Russia for political 
actions, and including harsh rhetoric emanating from President Putin that 
goes back to the Bush Presidency, it becomes easy for one to agree with 
Dmitry Medvedev that the United States and the Russian Federation are in 
a state of Cold War.
The United States and its allies moving to sanction Russia for interfering 
in the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine is also an excellent indicator of 
this new state of Cold War. Having had the sanctions in place since 2014, 
the question of how much the sanctions were affecting Russia was asked 
several times. The short answer is, as Putin stated, greatly. The long 
answer will need further explanation. 
Again, Vladimir Putin did state that the Western sanctions were affecting 
Russia greatly. This is actually an understatement. Before sanctions, 
the Russian economy was averaging a growth of 7 percent, but post 
sanctions, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contract by up to 5 
percent.39  What is also important to understand is that five of Russia’s 
eight most important trade partners (Germany, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and the United States) are economically sanctioning trade 
and affecting that economic growth.40 To respond, Russia has had to 
launch a campaign promoting a renewal of domestic production, similar 
to the United States’ Made in America movement, as well as work new 
agreements with Iran and North Korea: Countries currently at odds with 
the aforementioned trading partners. Yet these effects on the economy 
stretch far from trade, they are being felt within Russia itself. 
In the first year of sanctions, the Russian currency destabilized and 
fluctuated to an historical low at roughly 80 Ruble to one US Dollar. 
A year later, in January of 2016, the Ruble fell to this low price once 
more.41 This fluctuation in the national currency was mainly attributed 
to historically low oil prices. Since August of 2014, oil prices have been 
falling and, with it, so have Russian bank accounts.42 Real time wages have 
become stagnant, poverty levels are increasing, and inflation rates have 
continued to fall. The bottom line is that Russians are becoming poorer 
and are suffering because of Putin’s decision to interfere in neighboring 
Ukraine. This led to two significant things: Finally, a chance for Putin to 
lash out against the United States, but more importantly: A situation 
where Putin needed to rectify a threat to his status of power.
The chance for President Putin to address these two things came at the 
end of 2016 due to the US Constitutional restrictions on term limits and 
lengths of stay in office. By waiting until 2016, Putin knew that he could 
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outlast the Obama administration and wait to deal with the incoming 
Presidential administration. The gamble that Putin would have had to 
face in this instance was ensuring that the next US President would 
not continue the policies of Barack Obama, which has been shown 
to significantly hurt Russia. With former Secretary of State under the 
Obama administration Hillary Clinton running for office as one of the main 
candidates, this fear of a continuation of President Obama’s policies was 
that much closer to actualization, leaving President Putin in a state of 
panic and desperation. His next move would have been to do whatever it 
takes to prevent that from happening, including using state resources to 
alter the US Presidential election in favor of the route he desired. 
To circumvent a scenario where Secretary of State Clinton were to 
become President of the United States, President Putin chose a path to 
alter the integrity of the US election by influencing voters. This came 
through two different attack methods: Direct and indirect. Russian 
Intelligence Services directly attacked the heart of Clinton’s campaign 
by attacking the information technology architecture of the DNC: The 
political party backing Clinton’s bid in the race. This attack method 
leaked sensitive information and attempted to sink the DNC’s attempts 
at retaining the presidency while also forcing some senior officials from 
DNC leadership out of office. The second attack method attempted to 
influence voters through persuasion and division. This was done through a 
propaganda campaign that was both legitimate and illegitimate. 
The legitimate propaganda campaign divested resources in advertisement 
space through popular social media platforms to reach a wide audience. 
The illegitimate propaganda campaign came in the form of the troll 
factory. This Stalinist tactic ensured that people had to listen because 
they were being manipulated into joining the discussion. The idea was 
that these topics would subconsciously stay on the minds of the American 
public, especially at the time of voting. The results ended up creating 
a sharp divide between Americans either favoring or rejecting the idea 
of Hillary Clinton as President. The manipulation behind this campaign 
also successfully divided Americans on other sensitive issues, primarily 
race, and diverted the American conscious from international affairs to 
domestic ones that were rekindling old prejudices and rivalries. It led 
Americans to start despising each other and attempt to stop Americans 
from scorning Russia, a growing sentiment that stemmed from Russia’s 
violations of territorial sovereignty in neighboring states. This campaign 
was also the most successful in Russia’s information war against the 
West as it directly attacked the heart of Russia’s mistrust of the West: A 
powerful nation that had the power to inhibit Russia’s national objectives 
and international prestige.
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By attacking the United States through psychological means, Russia was 
able to make a mockery of its biggest rival, which stouts the reputation 
as the most powerful state in the world. Russia was also able to display 
to all its rivals the complexity in their doctrine of warfare, which allows 
lengthy study of an adversary to infiltrate one of its greatest strengths 
and turn it into a weakness. Make no mistake, despite this attack, social 
media and public opinion in the United States is one of its greatest 
strengths. It is what separates Americans from totalitarian governments 
and allows a state of moral high ground when compared to those it 
criticizes, but that also means that these same totalitarian states, such as 
Russia, can take advantage of that freedom. In this case, Russia took an 
unprecedented move by interfering in that freedom in order to advance 
its national goals by trying to deceive a sacred American process that 
will decide the fate of its national goals. By appealing to emotion, these 
attacks had hoped to persuade the American public into moving against 
itself, which would have subconsciously weakened the United States and 
strengthened Russia. Essentially, hijacking the American election was the 
most successful step in Russia’s current information war as it embarrassed 
Russia’s most prominent rival.
By embarrassing the United States and weakening the strength of its 
resolve, President Putin was strategically maneuvering his country out 
of the wake of the international sanctions led by President Obama’s 
administration. This would have been the case had President Trump, 
Obama’s successor, moved to halt the sanctions and restore relations to 
their pre-Obama era state. What Putin underestimated was the strength 
of the US Constitution and widespread distrust for Russia that the US 
Congress held. When the topic of renewing sanctions came up, the US 
Congress voted in such overwhelming force that President Trump be 
legally bound by the Constitution to reinforce the sanctions and enact 
Congress’ decision. While it would seem that hacking the American 
election was the only way that Russia could get around the sanctions and 
hoping to end them, Putin essentially became his own greatest enemy and 
reinforced the sentiments that had voted on the decision in the first place. 
Putin has put his country and himself in a state only to further 
antagonizing the United States, as the United States and the West have 
done to Russia, and conflate a new Cold War. This has not only come in 
the form of the election meddling, but in the form of modernizing the 
military. It should be no surprise that a major country strives to make its 
military as efficient as it can in order to maintain a status of a major power. 
What is surprising is that Russia’s motivation for modernizing has been to 
strive to reach a state of parity within some fields of military comparison 
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with the United States. This has led Russia to refocus on its deadliest 
weapons, its nuclear arsenal, as well as grow the size of its military. The 
new divisions of troops in the Western half of Russia indicates that Russia 
feels that it is at a distinct disadvantage with its rivals and feels extremely 
vulnerable on the fringes of its territory. This is understandable given 
Russia’s history of invasion in the last thousand years.
The most recent attack on Russia, and arguably the most catastrophic, 
was the German invasion in the 1940’s. The ensuing Cold War saw Russia 
separated from its rivals by many countries. Today, those countries have 
joined NATO and become Russia’s adversaries, meaning that the threat 
Russia faces is now directly on its borders. This makes Russia more 
vulnerable and frantic as the anxieties of a destructive war loom over the 
minds of the Russian elite. By increasing the size of its forces on the West, 
it also indicates that Russia is digging in and preparing for an invasion. 
In the West, these moves are seen as preparation for a preemptive 
invasion of NATO countries in a quest to restore past Soviet territory and 
give Russia that buffer zone that its predecessor state once had. These 
moves leave geopolitics in a state of increasing tension and increasing 
militarization as each side prepares to defend itself, something that has 
led to destructive conflicts in the past.
This path to refocus on Russia’s nuclear arsenal also gives indications 
of the current state of things. By adding to its nuclear arsenal and even 
moving so far as to break the INF Treaty, Russia is indicating that it feels 
that it no longer shares parity with the United States. This is because the 
United States has the technology to defend against nuclear weapons 
in the form of its ballistic missile defense shield and of the Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles. The move towards this 
technology helped end the Cold War, but it seems that it is a driving 
force of the New Cold War today. In response to the United States being 
able to shoot down its nuclear weapons, Russia has seen fit to build 
more in the idea that it can build more missiles than the United States 
can shoot down. That said Russia knows that militarily, it cannot just lash 
out against the United States in a physically destructive way, which can 
be extremely frustrating for a militarily powerful nation. That directed 
Russia to find an alternative, which led to the use of cyber means and 
attacking one of the instruments of power in the United States that leads 
the instruments of power in the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and 
Economic (DIME) application.
By attempting to control the source of US power before it could begin, 
Russia revealed just how tense relations are right now, and how far they 
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are willing to take this conflict with the United States. Russia also revealed 
that the United States does still have superiority over it in many fields, 
but that Russian cyber capabilities have come to a point where they may 
actually be Russia’s greatest asset, allowing Russia to attack the United 
States without facing dire consequences. What the election meddling also 
revealed was that in today’s age, the resolve of the American Government 
will not be shaken when faced by a moment of great weakness, and the 
principles that formed that government originally will overcome attacks 
from outside influences. Attacking the election process of the United 
States was an unprecedented move and is definitive proof that tensions 
between the United States and Russia have escalated to new Cold War. 
As Prime Minister Medvedev stated it shows that, while technology may 
have changed, the way we view the world has not and the contest for 
power is one that remains constant.
CONCLUSION
Tensions between the United States and the Russian Federation have 
reverted to a state not seen since the 20th Century. This renewed rivalry 
stemmed from Russian actions in neighboring Ukraine and other nations 
and the American reaction in the form of sanctions. By building an 
international coalition to sanction Russia, the United States renewed a 
state of geopolitics where it was Russia versus the West. The United 
States essentially backed Russia into a corner that President Putin and his 
government felt was threatening their existence. The implications have 
become widespread and vary across a wide spectrum, but focus on the 
aspects of cyber influence, military buildup, and disregard for previous 
international agreements.
The first implication has been a major focus on cyber capabilities and 
the influence of cyber operations. This field was virtually nonexistent 
during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
yet in today’s Cold War, it may be the most pivotal. This is because in 
today’s environment cyber actors can attack targets from anywhere and 
with as much speed and ferocity as they desire. Both the United States 
and Russia have shown that their capabilities are among the best in this 
field across the entire world. Both countries have attacked foreign rivals 
and done physical damage to physical infrastructure. Russia took this a 
step further by attacking the United States and attempting to alter the 
legitimate results of the US Presidential elections by using propaganda to 
sway the opinion of the American public. This act of information war was 
an attempt to control the way in which US foreign policy was conducted 
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abroad: Including with the way the US chooses to deal with Russia. 
Should the United States decide to respond, like measures of using cyber 
propaganda to reach the Russian population during the 2018 Presidential 
election in Russia maybe the best option, as it is believed that President Putin 
will run for re-election and fears losing the presidency to a liberal opponent.
The second implication has been to a major military buildup. The Russians 
have dedicated themselves to adding tens of thousands of troops near 
their Western border, where their territory makes contact with that of 
NATO aligned countries. The United States response has been to send 
thousands of its own troops to the Eastern borders of NATO territory 
to counter the growing presence. NATO’s overall response has been to 
ensure that it can monitor Russia in both the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. 
This increase in US troop presence has reversed the American policy of 
leaving Europe and led to the largest US troop presence in Europe since 
the Cold War in the 1980’s. At the edge of this military buildup is also the 
idea of rearming and refocusing on nuclear arsenals, which has gone so far 
as to infringe upon the state of previous international agreements.
The final implication has been a disregard for international agreements. 
Russia has long accused the United States of disregarding the sanctity of 
UN ruling by acting on the world stage unilaterally. When Russia chose to 
do the same, it caused a backlash that led to the current state of affairs in 
today’s world. With the current situation, one side feels more vulnerable 
than the other does, and that makes it less predictable. For these reasons, 
Russia has sought to seek some sort of parity with the United States. 
This quest for parity has led to Russia to disregard the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty  it signed with the United States, and the US 
responded by voting to do the same. The United States also stepped back 
from provisions in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which helped end 
the Cold War between itself and the Soviet Union in the late 20th Century.
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